The Foundations of Ethology
Pp. xvii, 380, 33 text-figs. Cloth, DJ, 8vo.
response by means of dummies does not, however, imply that the IRM does not still play a part, nor that the original key stimuli have become dispensable—as is the case in some other kinds of condi tioning. The effects of key stimuli and those of conditioned stimulus con figurations are added to one another, but their interdependence poses a problem which has not been sufficiently investigated. It is all too easy to offer, quite unintentionally, supernormal stimulation in the dummy. It is always
problem—by something unknown: a new conjecture. Secondly, I will suggest that scientists, whatever their philosophical atti tude towards holism, have to welcome reductionism as a method: they have to be either naive or else more or less critical reductionists; indeed, some what desperate critical reductionists, I shall argue, because hardly any major reduction in science has ever been completely successful: there is almost always an unresolved residue left by even the most successful attempts
insider's view of it. Would that other participants in the founding of ethology were moved to emulate Dr. Lorenz in sharing their impressions of its development. In such a spectrum of memoirs, this book would have a key position. Theodore Holmes Bullock University of California, San Diego La Jolla, California Preface In some respects, the development of a science resembles that of a coral colony. The more it thrives and the faster it grows, the quicker its first beginnings—the vestiges of the
"comparative" anatomy or "comparative" ethology, the adjective has a very special connotation. It does not mean simply a comparison of the similarities and differences that exist, among different species of animals, between the bodily forms or the behaviors—as was misleadingly assumed by the scientists who appropriated the word for use in the title of the Journal of Comparative Psychology. Comparative sci ence is the attempt to reconstruct, from the distribution of similarities and
instinct" and attributed excessive capacities, even infallibility, to the inborn, those of the other group denied its very existence. The purposive psychologists, who were quite aware of innate behavior patterns, regarded everything instinctive as inexplicable and, just as Bierens de Haan (1940), refused even to attempt a causal analysis. Those others who certainly would have been capable and ready to undertake such analytical research denied the existence of anything inborn, and dogmatically