The Philosophy of Animal Minds
This volume is a collection of fourteen essays by leading philosophers on issues concerning the nature, existence, and our knowledge of animal minds. The nature of animal minds has been a topic of interest to philosophers since the origins of philosophy, and recent years have seen significant philosophical engagement with the subject. However, there is no volume that represents the current state of play in this important and growing field. The purpose of this volume is to highlight the state of the debate. The issues which are covered include whether and to what degree animals think in a language or in iconic structures, possess concepts, are conscious, self-aware, metacognize, attribute states of mind to others, and have emotions, as well as issues pertaining to our knowledge of and the scientific standards for attributing mental states to animals.
shaking of the cup, and the noise thereby produced. We might accommodate this novel element through prior likelihoods p(n | M, s), where M is a map, s represents that a shaking of the cup occurs, and n represents that the ape’s sensors detect noise. But this maneuver substantially alters the model from section , in which prior likelihoods are conditional only upon cognitive maps, not upon spatiotemporal events (such as a shaking of a cup). An adequate theory of how the ape arrives at a suitable
generality constraint that it would be misleading to say anything other than that we are genuine thinkers and genuine concept-users (just as it would be misleading to describe someone with a slightly receding hairline as anything other than hirsute, or not bald). And conversely, many animals fall so far short of meeting the strong generality constraint that it would be quite inappropriate to describe them as having concepts at all (just as it would be inappropriate to describe someone with only a
system- thinking is the variety that is most familiar to us (since its operations are to a significant degree conscious), it is system that is the more basic, both ontologically and for explanatory purposes. For system- processes are largely realized in those of system . (One difference, in my view, is that system always involves the activity of the motor system, whereas system needn’t do so. See Carruthers [a].) In which case, although ordinary folk might be inclined to take
Sylvia. Nor does the lack of syntax arise because of an inability to mentally represent descriptive modifiers (a big leopard as opposed to a small one) and prepositions that specify locations (a leopard in a tree as opposed to one under a tree) . . . In their natural behavior, therefore, non-human primates and other animals certainly act as if they are capable of thinking, as it were, in sentences. But the ability to think in sentences does not lead them to speak in sentences – in our view,
(). The philosophy of animal minds () Affordance A (intensity I, direction D, in temporal interval dt, with control C ) Let us now turn to the feature-based representational system (FBS). Can a similar account be offered of how an animal can exercise metacognition? 4. non-conceptual contents in a feature-based format Our way of representing affordances in metacognition was exemplified by () There is (poor, excellent) A-ing affordance, where “A-ing” refers globally rather than